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The Quinean Heritage
At a first pass, it might appear misleading to construe Davidson as attempting to provide 
a theory of meaning on a purely extensional basis. For one thing, Davidson’s work is informed 
by Quine’s semantic nihilism couched by his indeterminacy of meaning thesis. For another, 
Davidson’s initial project was to pursue a compositional theory of meaning constrained by 
a theory of truth à la Tarski and a theory of communication and understanding that avoids 
reification of meaning, as Church’s semantics exemplify, at least according to Davidson. 
On closer inspection though, Quine’s philosophy of language has an immeasurable 
impact on Davidson. Quine’s philosophy sets the stage for Davison’s theory of meaning. The 
core of Davidson’s philosophy of language is Quine’s idea of a radical translator, who interprets 
another’s language on the basis of evidence that does not presuppose any detailed knowledge 
of his thoughts or any knowledge of the meanings of his words. The choice of this as the stance 
from which to investigate language and thought and their relation to the world is motivated by 
the flawed assumption that interpretation constitutes thoughts and beliefs. In his own words: 
the third-person approach to language is not a mere philosophical exercise. The point of 
the study of radical interpretation is to grasp how it is possible for one person to come 
to understand the speech and thoughts of another, for this ability is basic to our sense of 
a world independent of ourselves, and hence to the possibility of thought itself. The third-





This is the main assumption that I want to challenge is this paper. The radical interpreter 
must construct his picture of another’s thoughts and words and his connection with reality all at 
once out of the public resources available to any objective knower. Out of the investigation of the 
constraints on radical interpretation and the assumptions needed for success emerges a unified 
picture of human beings whose mind is constituted by the trade-offs between language and the 
world. Yet, even by accepting Quine’s framework, Davidson rejects Quine’s semantic nihilism by 
rejecting Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy: the same foreign sentence can be translated equally 
well by two (or more) different home language sentences. In the place of Quine’s nihilism 
Davidson proposes a semantic reductionism: 
When all the evidence is in, there will remain, as Quine has emphasized, the trade-offs 
between the beliefs we attribute to a speaker and the interpretations we give his words. But 
the resulting indeterminacy cannot be so great but that any theory that passes the tests will 
serve to yield interpretations’ (1984: 139). 
[I]ndeterminacy [of meaning or translation] is important only for calling attention to 
how the interpretation of speech must go hand in hand with the interpretation of action 
generally, and so with the attribution of desires and beliefs’ (1984: 154). 
This is the background to Davidson’s philosophical agenda. On the one hand, he 
acknowledges against Quine the importance of a theory of meaning and rejects Quine’s semantic 
nihilism. On the other, following Quine, he rejects the traditional assumption that intensional 
notions are primitive, that is, unaccountable in terms of more primitive notions. Moreover, he 
clearly endorses the highly questionable Quinean assumption that to avoid circularity a theory 
of meaning must explain communication without relying on intentional or semantic notions. 
The alternative is to propose a form of semantic reductionism that aims to account for semantic 
or intentional notions on a purely extensional basis: Tarki’s theory of truth. Has such a program 
any chances of success? The answer is no. 
My aim in this paper is not to show that Davidsons fails in addressing the so-called 
extensionality problem. That is no novelty. Even Davidsonians recognize that “Davidson’s initial 
hope that an extensionally adequate truth theory would ipso facto be interpretive fails” (Lepore 
& Ludwig 2005: 102). Yet, they consider that the extensionality problem is “not fatal to the initial 





project of pursuing a compositional meaning theory by way of an appropriately constrained 
truth theory” (Lepore & Ludwig 2005: 102). In contrast, my aim is to show that Davidson’s 
failure brings us back to Quine’s semantic nihilism and also renders his account of meaning 
something quite trivial. My main goal is to argue that Davidson & Quine’s framework, the 
radical translation/interpretation, is at the root of such failure. There is no priority of language 
over thought: radical interpretation is not the basis of sense and hence the possibility of thought. 
This is a remnant of the so-called linguistic turn that Davidson inherited from the analytical 
tradition. We must come back to the commonsense notion that to learn a language and to 
translate an alien tongue into our own is merely to learn a means of communicating and 
expressing thoughts, beliefs, or desires that we have already had. 
How shall I proceed here? After this brief introduction, the next section is devoted to 
presenting Davidson’s project and its extensionality problem. From the third section onwards, I 
begin to address the solutions proposed by Davidson for the extensionality problem. The third 
section, in particular, analyzes Davidson’s meaning of holism as a solution to the extensionality 
problem. I argue that this and the compositionality of natural languages is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for the extensionality problem. In the fourth section I examine Davidson’s 
principle of interpretative charity as a solution to the extensionality problem. In this section I 
argue that apart from not solving the problem, Davidson’s main formulation of the problem 
begs questions. In the fifth section I argue that the putative lawlike character of theorems 
also fail in providing an answer to the extensionality problem since laws are indifferent to co-
extensive predicates with different meanings. Here I argue briefly that Davidson’s idea of a 
reductionist theory of meaning can only be carried over if we abandon the methodology of 
radical interpretation. 
The Extensionality problem
Like Quine, Davidson believes that we cannot take any intensional notion as a primitive 
or given concept. Nonetheless, in opposition to Quine he still believes we can and must explain 
the concept of meaning without appealing to any intensional notion.
The starting point of a theory of meaning on a purely extensional basis comes to be 
Tarski’s celebrated theory of truth: 





A theory of truth will be materially adequate, that is, will correctly determine the extension 
of the truth-predicate, provided it entails, for each sentence s of the object language, a 
theorem of the form: “s is true iff p” where ‘s’ is replaced by a description of s and ‘p’
 
is 
replaced by a sentence that is true if and only if s is. (1984: 150) 
Davidson’s egg of Columbus is this: while Tarski takes the notion of translation as primitive 
and on this basis attempts to explain the notion of truth, Davidson reverses the relation between 
explicans and explicandum: he takes the notion of truth as primitive and on that basis seeks to 
clarify the notion of translation/meaning. Interestingly, it is only later, when he republishes 
his more than ten-year-old papers in a new collection, that he becomes self-aware of his own 
philosophical agenda: 
One thing that only gradually dawned on me was that while Tarski intended to analyse the 
concept of truth by appealing (in Convention T) to the concept of meaning (in the guise of 
sameness of meaning, or translation), I have the reverse in mind. I considered truth to be 
the central primitive concept, and hoped, by detailing truth’s structure, to get at meaning. 
(1984: XIV)
I propose to call a theory a theory of meaning for a natural language L if it is such that (a) 
knowledge of the theory suffices for understanding the utterances of speakers of L and (b) 
the theory can give empirical application by appeal to evidence described without using 
linguistic concepts specific to the sentences and words of L. (1984: 215, emphasis added)
Before proceeding, I have to admit my full agreement with Davidson at least as far as 
one fundamental point is concerned. Like him, I also think that there is nothing more primitive 
and trivial than the concept of truth. As important as the concept of truth may be, it is easily 
couched in Tarski’s theorems. Truth is what disquotation or Tarski’s theorems tell us. The different 
theories of truth that we find in tradition (adequacy, coherence, and consensus) take us nowhere 
beyond what is already captured by Tarski’s theorems. “The Hard problem” of the philosophy 
of language, to use the jargon of fashion, is a theory of meaning rather than a theory of truth.
The idea that the truth of the theorems suffices to capture the meaning of the expressions of 
a language has met much resistance. In the editors’ introduction to TM (TM henceforth), Gareth 
Evans and John McDowell echo the contributions to that volume by J. A. Foster and Brian Loar: 





The e fact that each axiom of a truth theory has its impact upon an infinite number of 
T-sentences does indeed have the consequence that it is difficult for counterfeit theories to 
pass the test provided by [convention T]. But . . . it is not impossible. Axioms for individual 
expressions may be chosen which, even though they disperse their inaccuracy, if construed 
as giving the meanings of those expressions, over as many T-sentences as there are sentences 
in which the expressions occur, nevertheless preserve the truth of all the T-sentences . . . It 
is thus obvious that more stringent conditions must be imposed upon a theory of truth, if it is 
to be seen as a theory of meaning, than that its T-sentences be true. (Evans and McDowell, 
1976: xiv, emphasis added) 
Ramberg rephrases the same objection decades later:
It is possible, given any theory of truth, to derive from it, with the aid of simple logical 
devices, a second theory that extensionally matches the first, yet would be unacceptable as 
a theory of meaning. (1991: 61)
Fodor & Lepore bring the same problem to the fore: 
So the situation seems to be this: Davidson says at one point that his program is to “take truth 
as basic and to extract an account of translation or interpretation” (“Radical interpretation,” 
p. 134). The obvious prima facie objection to this project is that, whereas notions like means 
that and the like are intensional, the truth of a T-sentence requires only equivalence of truth 
value (extensional equivalence) between the formula mentioned on the left and the formula 
used on the right.  lt  is thus reasonable to wonder how a theory constrained  only  to issue 
in true  T-sentences could hope to reconstruct the semantic relations.  Clearly, some further 
constraint must be placed on the truth theories that are to count as successful meaning 
theories (1992: 61-62)
It is always possible to derive from any given theory of truth, with the aid of logical devices, a 
second theory that matches the first, yet would be intuitively unacceptable as a theory of meaning. 
Following Fodor & Lepore, let me call this the extensionality problem. However, in opposition 
to Evans, McDowell, Fodor and Lepore, I am firmly convinced that imposing more stringent 
conditions upon a theory of truth brings no solution to the problem. A successful reductionist 
theory of meaning has to give up the old shabby analytical dogma that which prioritizes language 





over everything and hence to give up the entire framework of radical interpretation. 
As usual, Davidson never makes this problem explicit. Still, there is no doubt that he was 
quite aware of it. It appears tacitly implied in pages 25-26 of his TM: 
Still, this fact ought not to con us into thinking that a theory any more correct that entails 
‘“Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white’ than one that entails instead: (S) ‘Snow 
is white if and only if grass is green’.  (1984: 25-26)
In any case, the problem is easily formulated in the following terms. Since every true 
sentence is materially equivalent to any other equally true sentence, nothing prevents us from 
constructing theorems such as:
‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ is true in German iff grass is green.
‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ is true in German iff snow is white.
According to Davidson’s own words: 
The grotesqueness of (S) is in itself nothing against a theory of which it is a consequence, 
provided the theory gives the correct results for every sentence (on the basis of structure, 
there being no other way). It is not easy to see how (S) could be party to such an enterprise, 
but if it were - if, that is, (S) followed from a characterization of the predicate ‘is true’ that 
led to the invariable pairing of truths with truths and falsehoods with falsehoods - then 
there would not, I think, be anything essential to the idea of meaning that remained to be 
captured. (1984: 26) 
In both cases, the object language is German while the metalanguage is English. However, 
while intuitively theorem T correctly translates German sentences, S does not do, even though it 
is implicated by a theory of truth for German in the same way as T is. The extensionality problem 
can be expressed in the following terms: how is an extensionally adequate theory of the truth-
predicate for German able to exclude theorems such as S?
Let me briefly consider two bad suggestions as solutions to the problem. First, Evans & 
McDowell claim that if a theory of truth for language is to serve as a theory of meaning, it must 





be constrained by conditions the formulation of which “would involve employing psychological 
concepts; and some may see this as raising hopes for the reduction of the concept of meaning 
to the concept of psychological concepts” (1976: xv). Yet, as soon as we realize that psychological 
concepts like the concept of belief and the concept of concept are also intensional notions on the 
same footing as the concept of meaning, we also realize that Evans & McDowell’s suggestion is 
helpless.  What we need is a non-linguistic theory of meaning and belief. 
Second, Ramberg claims that: 
We should recall that a natural language is never a complete, clearly delineated entity, and 
hence give up the idea that a language can ever be modeled by a complete truth-theory. For 
it is only on the assumption that there is some one theory or other that definitively captures 
the meaning of the words of a language, that we can imagine a situation where convention 
T could not be used to rule out a ‘counterfeit theory’. (1991: 61)
In those words, Ramberg wants us to believe that a theory of meaning must coexist 
with Theorems like S just because we can never achieve a complete theory of truth for a given 
language. Well, as Davidson himself holds, theorems like S are nothing but grotesque. If a theory 
of meaning has to live with such grotesqueness as S, so much the worse for it.
Meaning Holism 
In his own unsystematic and confused way of putting things, Davidson presents at least 
three conditions that a theory of truth à la Tarski should satisfy in order to solve the extensionality 
problem. In TM, he initially suggests that meaning holism together with the compositionality 
of natural languages  could provide a solution to the extensionality problem. Yet, in the same 
article, he also mentions the putative nomological character of Tarski’s theorems of truth as 
an additional solution. The same suggestion reappears in his article “Reply to Foster”. Finally, 
in “Radical Interpretation,” the paper in which Davidson presents the definitive version of his 
reductionist theory of meaning, he suggests in addition that the principle of interpretative charity 
could provide a solution to the extensionality problem. Now, what is in fact disconcerting to any 
Davidson reader is that at no time did he make clear if each new condition replaces the previous 





one, or if they should be seen as complementary, or worst of all, if they amount to being the 
same requirement.
Let me appreciate meaning holism first.1 Davidson’s argument is condensed into a footnote: 
Critics have often failed to notice the essential proviso mentioned in this paragraph.  The 
point is that S could not belong to any reasonably simple theory that also gave the right 
truth conditions for “That is snow” and “That is white” (1984: 26, n.10)
If a theory of truth for German implies S and respects the compositional structure, then it 
will attribute erroneous truth conditions to other sentences in German containing the expressions 
“Schnee” and “weiss”, in particular to demonstrative sentences such as “Dies ist Schnee”; “Dies 
ist weiss”. For example, this would mean accepting the theorem:
1 A few elementary observations are required. First, generally stated, the principle of compositionality 
applies not only to complete sentences or propositions whose semantic value is the truth-value, but also to 
any syntactically complex linguistic expression. It says only that the semantic value of a syntactically complex 
expression is the value of the function whose arguments are the constituent terms of the complex expression 
plus the logical syntax of the complex expression.
 Second observation: compositionality rests on two trivial empirical facts. The first, known since 
Aristotle, is the so-called “productivity” of natural languages. The semantic value of a syntactically complex 
expression is the value of the function that has as its arguments the value of the simple terms constituting the 
complex expression plus the logical syntax of the complex expression. This is the empirical assumption that 
best explains our semantic capacity to construct an indefinite number of grammatically and semantically well-
behaved sentences, based on a finite lexicon and a logical syntax. 
 The second decisive empirical factor is systematicity. One who is able to utter “Peter loves Mary” is 
equally able to think” “Mary loves Peter,” though there is no implication between the sentences; after all there 
are unrequited loves. That the semantic value of a syntactically complex expression is the value of the function 
that has as arguments the value of the simple terms constituting the complex expression plus the logical syntax 
of the complex expression is by far the assumption that best explains systematicity as a capacity of any speaker.
 Third observation: compositionality is neutral in the face of atomism (building blocks) and of meaning 
holism. If I adopt a building-block theory, I could first assign semantic value to the component parts of complex 
linguistic expression and based on its logical syntax assign a semantic value to the complex expression. On the 
other hand, if I adopt a holistic theory, I would first have to attribute semantic value to sentences of a theory 
only then to assign semantic values to the components of such sentences. It is this second path that Davidson 
takes: meaning holism.





‘Dies ist weiss’ is true in German iff this is green. 
The first question that arises is whether holism is indeed a necessary condition for 
eliminating theorems like S. On closer inspection though, what is doing the job of excluding 
theorems like U is not meaning holism or the compositional nature of German, but rather the 
empirical data available to the interpreter. When he attempts to confirm U, by saying ‘dies ist 
weiss’ pointing to anything green, the speaker will refuse to assent. 
Let me take stock. I am firmly convinced that any theory of language that does not satisfy 
the condition of compositionality is doomed to failure. Nevertheless, as Davidson invariably 
speaks of compositionality as a constitutive condition, he seems to suggest that there could 
be no natural language that did not satisfy the principle of compositionality. I wonder: could 
we rule out a priori a language of unstructured expressions? I do not think so. Wittgenstein 
provides a counterexample: 
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right: the 
language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is 
building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him 
the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make 
use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; 
B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this 
as a complete primitive language.  (2009: § 2: 6, emphasis added)
Here goes another counterexample. Let us suppose two individuals (1 and 2), identical in 
many aspects, but distinct in a relevant mental aspect: while the former would have a standard 
memory of any person of his age and education, the latter has his brain wirelessly connected 
to a supercomputer from which his memory is fed by an impressive amount of data. While 
individual 1 states “snow is white” to say snow is white, subject 2 makes use of the unstructured 
expression “B” to mean the same. Likewise, while individual 1 uses the sentence “this is snow” to 
say this is snow, individual 2 uses the unstructured expression “N” to mean the same. And when 
individual 1 uses the sentence “this is cold” to say this is cold, individual 2 uses the unstructured 
expression “F” to means the same, and so on. Now, we may suppose that when circumstances 
induce individual 1 to utter: “this is snow,” the same circumstances induce individual 2 to utter 





“N.” If the first individual is able to infer from the sentence “this is snow” the sentence “this is 
cold,” the second is able to infer “F” from “N,” and so on. I wonder: what is the argument that 
proves that the language of 2 is impossible a priori?
Here is a methodological aspect of Davidson’s philosophy (not only his philosophy 
of language but also his philosophy of mind) that is often neglected: his shamefaced 
transcendentalism. If on the one hand Davidson declares himself a naturalist, on the other, 
he erects its principles (compositionality, interpretive charity, etc.) into the condition of 
constitutive principles, that is, a priori conditions of understanding. There is a tension here that 
every Davidson interpreter has to solve between Davidson’s semantic transcendentalism and 
Davidson’s Naturalism. 
But if meaning holism plus compositionality does not seem to be a necessary condition 
for excluding from our theory of truth German theorems such as S, the question is whether it 
would be at least a sufficient condition for the same ends. The answer is clearly negative when 
we consider that the predicates involved can be coextensive without being synonyms such as 
triangular and trilateral predicates. How to exclude theorems from form:
‘A is triangular’ is true in English iff A has three sides. 
Davidson’s Principle of Charity
Let us now turn our attention to the principle of interpretive charity. Precise articulation 
of the principle of charity turns out to be a tricky task when we take into account Davidson’s 
reductionist semantic. We find in Davidson’s work at least three different formulations. 
The first is the normative principle that we should maximize the truth of most of a native’s 
utterances in order to make sense of his utterances. The second is the normative principle that 
we should maximize agreement between the speaker and us interpreters in order to make 
sense of his utterances. And the third is the normative principle that we should maximize 
the consistency in the native’s system of beliefs in order to make sense of his utterances. The 
fundamental idea is that the interpreter can only find the speaker’s utterances false, disagree 
with the speaker, or find his beliefs inconsistent, after he has ensured the understanding of 
most of the speaker’s utterances. 





On closer inspection though, in light of the extensionality problem and Davidson’s own 
reductionist program, only the first formulation, viz. maximization of the truth of the native’s 
utterance, is acceptable. Unfortunately, Davidson usually confounds the first two and more 
seldom the three formulations and by doing so he obfuscates the significance of the principle 
and of his project2. Consider this: 
The method is intended to solve the problem of interdependence of belief and meaning by 
holding belief constant as far as possible while solving for meaning. This is accomplished by 
assigning truth conditions to alien sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly 
possible according, of course, to our own view of what is right. What justifies the procedure 
is the fact that disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a background 
of massive agreement.  Applied to language this principle reads: the more sentences we 
conspire to accept or reject (whether or not through a medium of interpretation), the better 
we understand the rest, whether or not we agree with them. (1984: 137, emphasis added). 
The basic methodological precept is, therefore, that a good theory of interpretation 
maximizes agreement. Or given that sentences are infinite in number, and given further 
considerations to come, a better word might be optimized. (1984: 169)
The method is not designed to eliminate disagreement; nor can it. Its purpose is to make 
meaningful disagreement possible and this depends entirely on a foundation- some 
foundation- in agreement. (1984: 196-197)
Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must 
count them right in most matters. (1984: 197)
The problem is that the concept of belief (and therefore also the concept of agreement) 
is an intentional concept. And its job is precisely to show how we get the intentional from the 
extensional. Belief and meaning must arise in the same way, simultaneously, by the imposition 
of structure on an infinite supply of extensional evidence. Yet, as a methodological principle, 
charity must apply also in the initial stages of theory construction. And since at this point there 
is nothing to which the interpreter can match her beliefs, no notion of matching beliefs or of 
agreement will capture the task of interpretation. 
2 See 1984: 137, 153, 169, 196-7, and also Davidson, 1980: 221, 290. 





That is the reason why we cannot take seriously Luke’s suggestion of replacing Davidson’s 
charity by Richard Grandy’s principle of humanity: 
The Principle of Charity counseled ‘Count them right in most matters’. The Principle of 
Humanity counsels ‘Count them intelligible or perhaps count them right unless we can’t 
explain their being right or can better explain their being wrong’. In other words, it prescribes 
the minimizing of unintelligibility - that is, of unintelligible agreement and disagreement. It 
has the singular virtue of being the principle we do in practice apply on the interpretation 
and translation of beliefs. (Lukes 1982: 262)
 Lukes holds that Davidson’s unqualified charity bases the necessary agreement on too 
many truths. He implicitly construes the principle as one to be applied in choosing between 
alternative existing translation schemes, because it supposedly works on the attribution of 
beliefs, something which is not possible until some kind of a theory of meaning is in place. 
However, in at least one passage, Davidson seems to suspect that the principle of charity 
formulated in terms of agreement is unacceptable:
My point has always been that understanding can be secured only by interpreting in a way 
that makes for the right sort of agreement. The “right sort”, however, is no easier to specify 
than to say what constitutes a good reason for holding a particular belief’ (1984: xvii). 
In short, considering Davidson’s writings, the principle of charity can be interpreted 
both in an extensional and in an intensional way. In a purely extensional way it reads that we 
must maximize the truth of what the speaker says to understand what is said. The problem 
faced by the interpreter is that of establishing a connection between the sentences of L and the 
observable circumstances of their being uttered. The extensional link is, of course, truth. Read, 
however, in the intensional form, the principle reads that we interpreters must maximize our 
agreement with the speakers by attributing our own beliefs to them. It goes without saying 
that in the intensional reading of the principle of charity Davidson begs the question at issue: 
in order to solve the extensionality problem he would be consciously or unconsciously giving 
up his project of formulating a theory of meaning on purely extension bases. He would exclude 
the theorem:





‘A is cordate is true in English iff A has kidneys. 
But he would do it because in order to maximize his agreement with the speaker he 
would have to assign his own belief to the speaker, in that he would have to give to “cordate” the 
same meaning it has in his language. In this way Davidson would be violating at the same time 
the restrictive conditions that he and Quine impose on a radical interpretation.
The alternative would be to read the principle of interpretive charity in an exclusively 
extensional way in accordance with the constraints of radical interpretation. In these terms, 
however, the appeal to the principle of charity provides no solution to the extensionality problem. 
If the cordate and renate predicates are coextensive, we will be charitable in interpreting their 
utterances by both Theorems W and:
A is a cordate is true in English iff A has a heart.
Lawlike Connections
Now let us turn to the requirement that theorems of theory must be laws. Again, for 
absolute lack of clarity, Davidson only clarifies how the nomological statute of the theorems à la 
Tarski could solve the problem of extensionality in a miserable note in the 1984-edition of TM:
This paragraph is confused. What it should say is that sentences of the theory are empirical 
generalizations about speakers and so be true but also lawlike. (S) presumably is not a law 
since it does not support the appropriate counterfactuals. It is also important that evidence 
for accepting the (time and speaker relativized) truth conditions for “that is snow” is based 
on causal connections between a speaker’s assent to the sentence and the demonstrative 
presentation of snow. (1984: 26, n.11)
What Davidson has in mind are generalizations of that form:
(GE) (x)(t) (if x belongs to the German speech community, then x holds true ‘es regnet’ on 
Saturday at t iff it is raining near x at t)





Therefore, it is false that:
(GE) (x)(t) (if x belongs to the German speech community, then x holds “Die Schnee is 
weist’ on Saturday at t iff grass is green near x at t) 
According to Segal, Davidson’s strategy is unsuccessful because Since it is a law that 
electrical and thermal conductivity would coexist in metals, the scientific statement (3) below 
supports a counterfactual construction:
“Copper conducts heat” is true in English iff copper conducts electricity.3 
Now, Segal’s objection would only be effective if the properties of conducting heat and 
conducting electricity were in fact coextensive (like triangular and trilateral), but they are not: 
there are cold conductors of electricity, the so-called superconductors. Given this, Davidson 
could retort that we must add the requirement that sentences of the theory follow laws of 
meaning holism: “this is copper”; “This leads to heat”; “That drives electricity”. To the extent that 
the speaker could assent to “this conducts electricity,” but not to “that conducts heat” (pointing 
to a superconductor), the interpreter could rule out theorem number Y.
However, the obvious objection is that sentences of the theory cannot be laws because 
they depend on linguistic conventions that are purely contingent. We use the phrase “snow is 
white” to say that snow is white thanks to numerous conventions of English. So, if S is not a law 
because it does not support the appropriate counterfactuals, neither is T: in possible worlds close 
to the actual world, one could utter “Gavagai” in English to say that snow is white. Moreover, 
even if such sentences were laws, they per se do not discriminate coextensive predicates. 
Consider again: 
‘A is triangular’ is true in English iff A has three sides. 
(x)(t) (if x belongs to the English speech community, then x holds ‘A is triangular’ on 
Saturday at t iff A has three angles near x at t.
If S is a law, then V above is also one. The moral is that there is no nomological solution 
to the extensionality problem within a linguistic framework like Quine’s radical translation or 
3 See Segal 1999.





Davidson’s radical interpretations. Indeed, assuming the linguistic turn, that is, the idea that 
there is priority of language over thought or that they are on the same footing, Quine is closer 
to the truth than Davidson. The thesis of indeterminacy seems plausible. 
However, it is plausible to assume that there are laws here that are not linguistic or 
formulated in terms of contingent linguistic conventions. For example, it is quite plausible 
to assume that there are laws here connecting brain states and mundane facts, for example, 
between some brain states of someone contemplating the snow and the fact that snow is white. 
It is reasonable to suppose that in worlds close to ours when creatures like us are faced with 
white snow, their brains are all in the same global state.
(x)(y)(t) (if x & y belong to the human race, then x & y are in the same brain state on 
Saturday at t iff they see snow near them at t.
It goes without saying that this lawlike connection between some brain states and the 
fact that snow is white is not enough to ensure that the brain represent the mundane fact that 
snow is white. Much more is needed. The first crucial assumption is that a particular brain state 
that nomologically covariates with the color white is “recruited” due to evolutionary reasons to 
indicate that color so that when that state fulfills that indication-function it veridically represents 
the color white; otherwise it has misrepresented it. 
Something similar occurs with the brain state that nomologically covariates with the 
presence of snow. Per se, that brain state does not represent the snow. However, that it may be 
recruited due to evolutionary reasons to indicate the presence of snow so that when the state 
fulfills that indication-function it veridically represents the snow; otherwise it has misrepresented 
it. Now what is worth noticing is that the “recruitment” is the crucial moment when the brain 
state becomes a mental state endowed with a natural meaning, namely to indicate the presence 
of white. I do not appeal to any intensional notions like Davidson. Instead, I account for it in 
terms of something that is neither intensional not mental: biological functions. 
Now, as the German sentence of the object language ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ expresses a 
belief, something more is needed. We must assume in addition that SNOW and WHITE are 
concepts in the speaker’s mind. Thus, by learning processes those brain states are “recruited” a 
second time to indicate not a particular token of white or a particular token of snow, but rather 
every type of snow and white for which those particulars are tokens. 





Given this, we may rule out S as a bad translation of the German sentence of the object 
language ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ because S does not express a lawlike connection and because 
the speaker’s brain states when he utters ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ do not have the function of 
indicating the fact that grass is green. Now, in this picture Davidson’s famous triangulation 
assumes another form.  To be sure, people share the same environment. Moreover, that 
environment elicits in their brains the same states and in virtue of evolution and learning they 
also share the same belief, namely that snow is white.  
My proposal nicely handles the cases of coextensive predicates with different meanings. 
Let us take a closer look: 
‘The dog has a heart is true in English iff the dog is a renate.
The dog has a heart is true in English iff the dog is a cordate. 
The nomological covariation between brain states and mundane fact is purely extensional 
and hence cannot rule Y out: if it is a law that all cordates have a heart, it is also a law that all 
cordates have kidneys. Likewise, the states of brain that covariate with renate animals also 
covariate with cordate animals. Still, if the nomological connection dos not cut the ice, the 
teleological element can easily capture the different meaning of coextensive predicates. Why 
so? Because between all brain states that covariate with cordates and renates, the learning 
process “recruits” a few of them to indicate cordates while the learning process recruits others to 
indicate renates. That is enough to rule out Z as a bad translation and to endorse AA. 
I would like to finish this paper with some methodological observations. First, Davidson 
is unable to find a solution to the extensionality problem because he remains imprisoned by 
the linguistic turn. To be sure, he disagrees with Dummett when the latter claims the priority 
of language over thought, the key dogma of analytical philosophy. Yet, he still believes that 
language and thought are at the same level of analysis when clearly thinking precedes language. 
To learn a language and to translate a language is nothing more than to learn how to express 
previously existent thoughts and beliefs. 
Now, a Davidsonian may raise the following key objection. Quine and Davidson’s cons-
traints on radical interpretation make nothing available as empirical data apart from the 
speaker’s linguistic and non-linguistic behavior. The field linguist has the job of translating a 





completely unknown language that has no historical or cultural connections with any known 
language, and for which the linguistic has no manuals or recourse to bilinguals. Given this, how 
does the interpreter figure out in which of the two brains states (one having the function of 
indicating renates while the other the function of indicating cordates) the speaker is in when a 
rabbit crosses his way and he utters: “Gavagai”? Indeed, there is no way. But and so what? That 
only shows that there is something deeply wrong with Quine and Davidson’s framework. A 
theory of meaning cannot be provided as a radical interpretation.  
RESUMO
O projeto semântico de Davidson toma a forma de reducionismo que visa explicar as noções intencionais com 
base em noções puramente extensionais. O objetivo desse trabalho consiste na investigação do fracasso do projeto 
de Davidson como um argumento indireto contra sua suposição segundo a qual a chamada interpretação radical 
seria o fundamento do significado linguístico e do pensamento.
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ABSTRACT
Davidson’s semantic program is a form of semantic reductionism that aims to account for intensional notions on 
a purely extensional basis. My aim in this paper is not to show that Davidsons fails in addressing the so-called 
extensionality problem. That is no novelty. Even Davidsonians recognize Davidson’s failure. My main goal is to 
explore Davidson’s failure as an indirect argument against his key assumption that the radical interpretation is 
the basis of sense and hence the possibility of thought. There is no priority of language over thought. This is a 
remnant of the so-called linguistic turn that Davidson inherited from the analytical tradition. The moral is the 
following: we must come back to Lockean common sense that to learn a natural language and to translate an alien 
tongue into our own is merely to learn a vehicle for communicating and expressing thoughts we have already had.
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